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Introduction
Illicit drugs is a multi-billon dollar industry that spans the globe, and nearly every
nation attempts to implement policies to control this trade. Two drugs that are identified
as particularly dangerous and have been targeted by many nations around the world are
cocaine and heroine. These drugs are derived, respectively, from the coca bush and the
opium poppy, and it is the cultivation of these two crops which is the focus of this study.
Through an examination of the economics and politics concerning these crops and an
analysis of the policies aimed at them, this study will foster a better understanding of this
part of the drug trade with the intent that more effective policies will result.
This specific portion of the drug trade was selected because of a general interest
in economic and political issues in the world’s less developed nations, as well as the
added complexities of this segment of the illicit drug industry. These crops are grown in
remote portions of a number of less developed countries, and unlike other parts of the
drug industry, this segment is dominated by fairly poor peasants and farmers who are
difficult to vilify. This characteristic, along with the wider array of policy options
available for combating the cultivation of these crops adds a political complexity that is
lacking in other portions of the drug trade.
It is important to note that the illicit nature of the drug trade leads to a lack of hard
data, since it is in the interest of all industry participants to conceal their activities. As a
result of this lack of clear and specific data, information is instead in the form of agency
estimates, which include considerable error and vary greatly from agency to agency.
Because of these issues much of the information presented in this paper will, by
necessity, be more general and conceptual instead of concrete and specific.
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The two main production regions for opium and coca, Afghanistan and Andean
South America, will be analyzed separately. The national/regional analysis will examine
the history and development of the trade in these crops, the economics of illicit crop
cultivation, and the impacts, political and economic, resulting from the trade. After these
analyses, policy impacts on illicit drug cultivation will be examined, and policy
recommendations for each region will be given.

Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a Central Asian nation with a tumultuous past and considerable
modern instability. The recent history of Afghanistan has been marred by nearly 3
decades of constant conflict, culminating in the overthrow of the Taliban and the current
presence of international forces. This time period has also witnessed Afghanistan’s
transformation into the world’s dominant producer of illicit opium.

History and Development
There is no certainty concerning when opium was introduced to Afghanistan.
Some place its introduction to the time of Alexander the Great, when his armies came
through Afghanistan, around 300 BC, on their way to India, others place the introduction
of opium poppies to the time of the Muslim advance eastward across Afghanistan, around
the 7th or 8th century AD (Asad & Harris, 2003, p. 26). In either case opium has been
cultivated in the region for over 1,000 years and has, in its raw form, been used
traditionally for both medicinal and recreational purposes (Asad & Harris, 2003, p. 26).
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Despite the exploitation of opium for commercial use and trade in other parts of
the British Empire, opium in Afghanistan remained a crop cultivated almost exclusively
for domestic traditional consumption well into the 20th century (Noelle-Karimi, Scheffer,
& Schlagintweit, 2002, p. 111). A number of international events that occurred in 1979
saw the Afghan opium trade change dramatically. During 1979 the Iranian Revolution
and the start of the Afghan-Soviet War provided the necessary impetus to transform the
Afghan opium trade from one of traditional domestic consumption to a main global
source for illicit opium and its resulting heroin.
Prior to the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran was a main source of
illicit opium, which was then processed into heroin either within Iran or in neighboring
Turkey, before being transferred to the global heroin market. Following the Islamic
Revolution, the government of Iran began a crackdown on opium cultivation, refining
and trafficking, leading not only to a decrease in opium cultivation within Iran, but also
to an expulsion of Iranians involved in the opium trade. A number of these individuals
took up residence in Afghanistan and created an infusion of knowledge and experience
concerning the processing and international trafficking of opium and its derivatives (Asad
& Harris, 2003, pp. 51-52).
While the Iranian Revolution helped to provide the knowledge and the market
shortage necessary to transform the Afghan opium trade, it was the Afghan-Soviet War
that is widely considered to have sparked that transformation. Conflict within
Afghanistan between the Soviet allied communist government of Afghanistan and
Afghan resistance forces resulted in direct involvement of the Soviet military. The result
of this was a decade-long war between the Soviet Union, and the Mujahideen, or holy
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warriors, who were covertly supported by the United States. The need for a lucrative
source of funding for the Mujahideen, combined with the destruction of infrastructure
and traditional sources of livelihood, fueled the trade in illicit opium (Noelle-Karimi et al,
2002, p. 118).
The use of opium as a source of funding for Afghan fighters continued after the
1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops and the 1992 collapse of the communist government.
The various warlords and factions fighting in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s wreaked
even greater havoc on Afghan infrastructure and traditional sources of livelihood, further
increasing Afghan economic dependence on opium. The U.S. invasion of 2001 brought a
halt to much of the factional infighting of Afghanistan, however opium remains a vital
part of the political and economic framework of the nation.

Economics of Illicit Drug Cultivation
Opium is obtained from the opium poppy, an annual plant that is grown in many
regions around the world. In Afghanistan the poppies are planted in October or
November, requiring low temperatures to germinate, and after germinating are capable of
withstanding sub-freezing temperatures. The poppies then blossom in the spring and
after pollination the seed capsule swells and the flower petals fall. This generally occurs
around April, and it is at this stage that the opium is ready for harvest. Each pod receives
up to 6 shallow incisions and is then left overnight to allow the resin that has leaked out
to dry and firm. The resin is then scraped from the seed capsule and ready for sale or
storage. This is a very labor intensive and tedious process, with the collection of 1kg of
raw opium requiring an estimated 40 to 50 man hours of labor (Asad and Harris, 2003,
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pp. 24-25). The opium poppy has a number of advantages that make its cultivation
especially appealing. The poppy is a very drought resistant crop, with some indications
that it can be grown with as little as 15 inches of annual rainfall, also the short growing
season and the timing of the growing season allows for double cropping in some areas,
where after the opium has been harvested another crop, often a staple food, can be grown.
Once collected, the opium resin is easy to store, as it does not spoil or lose value, and is
easy to transport, with a very high value to weight ratio (Asad and Harris, 2003, p. 24;
Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p. 112).
Indications of the profit garnered from poppy cultivation compared to the
cultivation of more traditional crops vary widely. One main reason for this variance is
the dramatic swing in the price of opium that has been observed over the last few years.
Estimates for the price of a kilo of opium varied from $25 to $60, based upon region and
time of year, during the late 1990s, however this price structure would soon undergo a
dramatic change. In 2000 the Taliban claimed opium to be against Islam and banned its
cultivation, curiously however it did not ban the trade in opium. Following the ban the
price of a kilo of opium skyrocketed, reaching the $400-$500 dollar range. The effects of
this price shock lasted beyond the rule of the Taliban, with a kilo of opium still fetching a
price above $200 on into 2003, despite record harvests (Noelle-Karimi et al, 2002, pp.
130, 146; Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p. 115). Another cause of the variation in profit
observations stems from variation of yield, some estimates indicate yields up to 50 kilos
per hectare for non-irrigated land and up to 90 kilos per hectare on irrigated land, while
others indicate regional yields of around 25 to 30 kilos per hectare (Asad and Harris,
2003, p. 11; Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p. 115). Regardless of the drastic variation in
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estimates, it is clear that opium is a more profitable crop than wheat, the main traditional
crop with which it is often compared. It is simply the magnitude of difference in
profitability that varies, ranging from opium being 30 times as profitable as wheat, to
being 50 to 100 times as profitable (Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p. 115; Noelle-Karimi et al,
2002, p. 145).
Another key characteristic of opium production in Afghanistan is that it fulfills
the economic expectations concerning specialization in those goods which utilize the
factors of production that are available in abundance while conserving those factors of
production that are scarce. Opium cultivation is very labor intensive, especially relative
to wheat, with the cultivation of one hectare of opium requiring 350 work days of labor,
while wheat requires only 41 work days. In addition to this difference based on labor
inputs, the cultivation of opium requires less than half the water necessary for the
cultivation of wheat. Given the extreme unemployment in Afghanistan, estimated to be
around 70 percent in Kabul in early 2000, and the scarcity of water in an arid
environment with severe infrastructure damage, the cultivation of opium makes economic
sense for its conservation of the scarce water resource and utilization of the abundant
labor resource (Steinberg, Hobbs, & Mathewson, 2004, pp. 68-69).
In addition to these immediate economic conditions, there are a number of more
structural conditions, largely the result of the decades of conflict, which shape the
cultivation decision. As is common in warfare, the infrastructure of Afghanistan was
widely targeted and largely destroyed. This destruction of the Afghan infrastructure
system makes transportation of goods significantly more difficult, increasing the
transportation cost of taking produce to market. It is this situation that helps to make
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opium a much more attractive crop for trade purposes, since a given weight or volume of
opium is considerably more valuable than the equivalent weight or volume of wheat,
making the transportation costs of opium much smaller when measured as a portion of
value. In addition to the general destruction of the infrastructure system during the
conflict, the nature of the fighting, being Afghan against Afghan for many years, allowed
for very specific targeting of those resources of greatest value.
An interesting characteristic of Afghan culture surrounds the cultivation of
orchards, specifically walnut, pistachio, and mulberry, which acted as a natural famine
relief. The deep rooted nature of these trees allows them to withstand the periodic
droughts that strike Afghanistan, providing sustenance to the population in the event of
crop failure, as well as providing a marketable surplus is times of plenty. These orchards,
however, have been targeted and destroyed during the fighting, removing the traditional
safety net put in place by the Afghans to fend off drought induced famine. There is
considerable indication that many Afghan communities have replaced these orchards,
which take many years to root and mature in the arid climate, with fields of poppies,
which provide the same drought resistance and marketable surplus (Steinberg et al., 2004,
p. 67). Another tactic utilized during the fighting that is indicative of the “scorched
earth” nature of the conflict, and has attributed to the economic condition of Afghanistan,
was the sabotage of irrigation systems. During the fighting opposing forces would mine
the underground irrigation aqueducts, known as karez, as well as the surface canals that
carried the irrigation water to the fields. This mining prevented the communities down
stream from clearing the irrigation system of the annual sediment buildup, reducing the
flow of water. This sabotage of the irrigation systems increased the scarcity of water in
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an already arid region, causing residents to increase their reliance on drought resistant
crops, namely poppies (Steinberg et al, 2004, p. 143).
When all these factors are together taken into consideration we can see that the
alternatives to opium cultivation are limited, making the opportunity cost of producing
opium minimal. Additionally there is little if any social stigma attached to the cultivation
of poppies. In the event of a significant social stigma, one could view this as an
additional cost of production, in which the decision to cultivate reduces social standing or
causes one to be ostracized by society, theoretically reducing quality of life. This stigma
would inflict a type of “psychic cost”, or quantity of income that would be willingly
sacrificed in order to avoid this stigma. In this case however there appears to be little or
no costs associated with social views of opium production. While there are some villages,
landowners, and local commanders (warlords), which have forbidden the cultivation of
poppies, the view of the vast majority of Afghans is that the crop is exported, and if any
harm comes from the opium it is inflicted upon the West and is a result of their own
hedonism and moral decadence (Johnson & Leslie, 2004, pp. 118,120).
The lack of a strong central government has led to a lack of significant costs
associated with breaking the law. Normally when undertaking an illegal activity there is
some fear of being caught and punished by the authorities. Associated with this fear is a
perceived probability of being caught and punished, and a perceived cost of that
punishment. The situation in Afghanistan has developed so that there is little if any fear
of facing the legal consequences of involvement in the opium trade. The central
government is extremely weak, the local governors and commanders (warlords) are
largely either personally involved in the trade or receive bribes or “taxes” from the trade,
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and the military forces on the ground are largely ignoring the cultivation of opium as they
are faced with the ongoing insurgency. This combination of factors indicates that there is
little to no cost associated with legal repercussions of poppy cultivation (Johnson &
Leslie, 2004, pp. 117,129).
Looking at these facts, we see that opium is a good with strong economic
incentives for production, high returns, low opportunity costs, and low institutional costs
imposed by society or government. In addition to these economic conditions, there are
some indications that the decision on the part of farmers to grow opium is not solely
economic. While there was little information provided, and it is difficult to discern the
level to which this affects the opium harvest, reference was made to the fact that opium
cultivation was partially the result of the coercive influence of local commanders
(warlords) (Steinberg et al, 2004, p. 79). These motivations for production have resulted
in Afghanistan currently producing an estimated 4,000 metric tons of opium, accounting
for nearly 90% of world illicit opium cultivation. Even more revealing is the fact that the
opium and associated heroin industry accounts for an estimated 40-60% of Afghanistan’s
Gross Domestic Product (Committee on International Relations, 2005, pp. 1,2,4).

Impacts of Illicit Drug Cultivation
The use of opium to fund various Afghan fighting groups during the AfghanSoviet war, and the continuation of this funding throughout the 1990s and through today
has been the greatest impact of opium on Afghanistan. The funds provided by opium
during the civil war of the 1990s helped to perpetuate the conflict and to increase the
intensity of fighting and the number of groups involved. Opium provided increased
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incentives for various commanders to gain control over fertile land and important
trade/smuggling routes, as well as providing the money necessary to feed, pay, and most
importantly arm their private armies. The result of this continuation of conflict was the
continued destruction of the Afghan licit economy and the increase in dependency on the
opium poppy (Noelle-Karimi et al, 2004, p. 111).
Even now, following the end of the civil war and the establishment of the Afghan
government, opium has extreme influence over the power structures within Afghanistan.
One significant way in which this political influence of opium is demonstrated is through
its ability to corrupt officials of the Afghan government. Reports of opium traders
bribing Afghan governors up to $10,000 a month are indicative of the level of corruption
that exists, as well as demonstrating the disproportionate wealth created by opium in a
nation with a per capita GDP of $800 in 2004 (Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p. 117; CIA,
2006). In addition to government officials, local commanders or warlords continue to
earn substantial sums of money from the opium trade. The local commanders not only
receive payments from traders similar to those paid to the government officials, but they
also profit from direct involvement in the trade, growing poppies on their landholdings.
The local commanders utilize significant portions of these proceeds to maintain their
private militias and influence in their areas (Johnson & Leslie, 2004, pp. 117,123).
The corruption of local officials and enrichment and empowerment of local
commanders de-legitimizes the state and places extreme restrictions on the policy options
available. When local officials are so easily corrupted and the official policy of the state,
in this case the illegality of opium, are flagrantly ignored it causes serious issues with
credibility and confidence in state power. Even more importantly is the issue of
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commander empowerment. Over twenty years of war, local commanders established
bases of power and private militias, and the most recent changing of the guard in Kabul
has had little if any impact on their power over the rural areas of Afghanistan. The
weakness of the central government requires the state to co-opt these commanders and, if
not gain their allegiance, at least eliminate open hostilities (Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p.
51). The heavy involvement of most of these commanders in the opium trade not only
provides the funds necessary to maintain their positions of power, but ensures that the
Afghan government cannot undertake any serious attempts at crushing opium cultivation.
Any such attempt would risk open conflict across much of rural Afghanistan, a situation
the government in Kabul simply cannot risk.
The impacts of opium on the economy of Afghanistan are somewhat unclear and
are certainly complicated by the conflict that has engulfed the nation. The information
from the Committee on International Relations concerning the trade in opium and its
derivatives accounting for an estimated 40-60% of Afghan GDP demonstrates the height
of Afghan dependence on the illicit drug trade. This infusion of wealth has dramatically
changed the economic condition of many families and villages, bringing higher standards
of living than are otherwise possible (Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p. 118). There is
uncertainty whether this infusion of wealth boosts the legitimate economy or undermines
it. It is difficult to determine how much of the dependence on opium is due to the
superior profitability of the crop, and how much is due to the destruction of the legal
economy. As was discussed in the incentives portion of the Afghan analysis, there are
significant structural issues concerning destroyed transportation networks, sabotaged
irrigation systems, and razed orchards which certainly play a part in the dominance of
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poppies. It is likely that only after these conditions have been improved will we see the
extent to which the opium poppy has, as a result of its individual characteristics and
profitability, supplanted the licit economy and forced the whole of the Afghan economy
to become increasingly dependent on its trade.
While opium has brought increased income to much of Afghanistan, it has also
brought conflict and serious problems of governance. The Afghan state is not only
weakened as a result of corruption and a lack of state credibility, but the continued power
of local commanders poses a direct threat to state power. The boost to income caused by
opium is ultimately overshadowed by its undermining of the state and the potential threat
it poses to the legal economy.

Andean South America
The three Andean nations of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia have been plagued by
political instability and internal conflict. Against this backdrop of guerrilla movements,
overthrown governments, and a general lack of state control, these nations have
developed into the centerpiece of illicit coca production.

History and Development
The coca bush is indigenous to the Andean region of South America and has been
used by the native cultures of Peru and Bolivia since pre-Colombian times. The coca
leaves have been utilized for religious purposes, as well as for their ability to suppress
hunger and relieve altitude sickness (Allen, 2005, p. 35). This traditional use of coca
continues through today, and is very common in Peru and Bolivia.
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Unlike in the case of Afghanistan, the transition of Andean coca cultivation from
being primarily focused on domestic traditional use to being focused on the international
cocaine trade is not clear and there appears to be no identified set of specific events that
marked the shift. The growth of the illicit coca trade in the Andes was much more
organic because the illicit market for cocaine was being created and developed at the
same time as the supply of cocaine and illicit coca was being developed.
The greatest influencing factor in the development of the illicit coca trade was the
development and explosion of the drug subculture in the United States. This initially led
to connections in the early 1970s between American smugglers and Colombian farmers
in the trade of marijuana. Colombian smuggling organizations quickly gained control
over this trade, and beginning in the mid to late 1970s began to experiment with small
shipments of cocaine. These shipments proved extremely profitable and as the smugglers
acquired wealth their operations continued to expand. It is important to note that
Colombia is not a historically significant producer of coca, as it has a very small
indigenous population and there is little to no traditional use, as a result these early
Colombian experiments with cocaine utilized Bolivian and Peruvian coca (Thoumi, 2003,
pp. 84-85).
Paralleling this development in Colombia was the development of the
coca/cocaine industry in Bolivia. Attempts to use the colonization of undeveloped lands
and frontiers as a release valve for population pressures and economic constraints is quite
common in Latin America. Since the 1940s the government of Bolivia has promoted the
colonization of the Chapare to relieve highland population pressures. As a result of this
colonization, the Chapare, also known as the Tropics of Cochabamba, has become the
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site of nearly all of Bolivia’s illicit coca cultivation (Thoumi, 2003, p. 111). In the early
to mid 1970s the cocaine industry began to develop in Bolivia, with wealthy families of
the agricultural elite organizing drug processing and trafficking syndicates, utilizing the
coca cultivated in the Chapare. Some of these groups expanded and developed rapidly,
with reports indicating that by 1978 the Bolivian organizations were delivering processed
cocaine to both the East and West coasts of the United States (Allen, 2005, pp. 45-46).
One important piece of information to note is that the Banzer dictatorship that controlled
Bolivia from 1971 to 1978 had many ties to these Bolivian drug trafficking organizations.
While there is no hard evidence that the Banzer regime was directly involved in the trade
many individuals close to Banzer were key figures in the organizations and it appears
clear that the government, at the very least, chose to look the other way (Thoumi, 2003,
p. 119).
Peru’s involvement was solely in the coca side of the trade. Similar to the case of
Bolivia, the Peruvian government encouraged colonization of the Huallaga Valley.
During the 1970s the military government of Peru took control of private property in the
area and replaced it with state-managed cooperative farms, which ultimately failed and
left the large population of recent colonists more or less abandoned. The lack of
significant state presence in the area following the collapse of the state farms, and the
newly booming demand for coca as a result of the growing cocaine industry in Colombia
turned the Huallaga Valley, and especially the more remote Upper Huallaga Valley, into
one of the world’s dominant coca producing regions (Kay, 1999, pp. 100-101).
Following these developments in the mid to late 1970s, the cocaine and illicit
coca trades came of age in the 1980s. Colombia specialized in the processing and
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trafficking of cocaine, while Peru and Bolivia became the source for the necessary coca.
Coca cultivation was concentrated in the Huallaga Valley of Peru and the Chapare of
Bolivia, however Colombia began to increase its share of coca cultivation going from
nearly zero coca to producing 11% of the world coca crop by 1987 (Thoumi, 2002, p.
105). Throughout the 1990s the trend towards greater coca cultivation in Colombia
continued while eradication and interdiction efforts in Peru and Bolivia increased, and by
the end of the decade Colombia had become the number 1 producer of coca in the world.
The late 1980s and the 1990s have also witnessed the increased involvement of
Colombian and Peruvian guerrillas in the coca and cocaine trade (Kay, 1999, p. 103;
Davids, 2002, pp. 24-25). This series of events brings us to the current situation, and
allows us to begin the examination of the modern drug trade.

Economics of Illicit Drug Cultivation
The coca bush is a perennial shrub that is indigenous to the Andean region and
grows especially well between 500 and 1500 meters of elevation, and also requires
substantial rainfall (Steinberg et al, 2004, p. 252). After planting, the shrubs must grow
for at least 18 months before the first crop can be harvested, and full production is not
reached until the plant is 2 to 4 years old. Once established, the coca fields can be
harvested up to six times a year, providing a year round crop that has a reliable market.
Following the harvest, the leaves must be dried in the sun within 2 to 3 days in order to
prevent mildewing. After having been dried they can be sold for processing (Allen,
2005, pp. 36-37).
The profitability of coca cultivation varies considerably, however coca is
generally 4 to 19 times as profitable as other crops. This variance in profitability is again
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the result of varying yields and varying prices (Lupu 2004, 410). Estimated yields vary
from 1.8 to 7.6 metric tons of leaf harvested annually for every hectare cultivated. The
variation in yield is a result of varying climate, intensity of cultivation, and age of the
shrubs, as production decreases beyond a certain point (Allen, 2005, p 36-37). The
variation in price is very high as well, with prices varying from $.40 to $4.50 per kilo of
dried leaves (Kay 1999, 107).
This price volatility was especially pronounced in Peru, where it was so drastic
that for a period the profitability of coca decreased to the point that coca harvests actually
declined. This swing in price was largely due to the aggressive aerial interdiction efforts
of the Peruvian Air Force. Coca paste and cocaine base had been historically transported
to Colombia for further refinement and later trafficking by way of the “Peruvian Air
Bridge”, the use of many small aircraft to smuggle goods into Colombia. Beginning in
1989, attempts were made to shutdown this smuggling route. Over the next 6 years the
operation was suspended and reinstated a number of times as the result of
counterinsurgency operations, legal issues, and a brief military confrontation with
Ecuador. Throughout this period the price of coca leaves inside Peru fluctuated
markedly, peaking when the interdiction operation was suspended and collapsing when
the operation was reinstated, in response to Colombian demand and the ability to fulfill it.
Once the operation was reinstated in 1995 it remained in place and it was in the ensuing
years that the price of Peruvian coca dropped to $.40 per kilo. This price volatility in the
early 1990s and the low price that persisted for a number of years following 1995 caused
Peruvian coca cultivation to decline during the period, from an estimated 1992 level of
129,100 hectares under active cultivation to an estimated 1997 level of 94,000 hectares
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under active cultivation and falling all the way to an estimated 2000 level of 43,000
hectares (Kay 1999, 107-109; Steinberg et al, 2004, p. 89). Peruvian prices again
increased around 2000-2001 to $4 per kilo, a response to alternatives to the “Peruvian Air
Bridge” by utilizing river transports through the Amazon basin to fill the Colombian
market gap that resulted from the aggressive and largely successful eradication campaign
underway in Bolivia at the time. This price increase caused Peruvian cultivation to
increase, from the 2000 level of 43,000 hectares to an estimated 2001 level of 51,000
hectares (Steinberg et al, 2004, p. 89).
As in the case of Afghan opium, coca also fulfills economic expectations
concerning the utilization of scarce and abundant resources. Most importantly, coca
needs very little initial investment to begin production, requiring between $170 and $250
per hectare in start up costs, compared to around $500 for bananas, $1,500 for hearts of
palm, and $5,000 for pineapple (Thoumi, 2003, p. 318; Allen, 2005, p. 37). Latin
America is, much like the rest of the developing world, known for capital scarcity, and
capital is especially scarce in the remote regions in which coca is grown. This limited
need for capital and coca’s multiple harvests, which provides year round employment in
regions characterized by high un- and under-employment, make it economically logical
(Allen, 2005, p 37).
These comparisons of profitability, discussion of price signals, and analysis of
input use are only one part of the comparison between coca and alternative crops. A
significant factor behind the coca trade is the nature of the farmers’ coca cultivation and
the environment in which they live. The regions that produce coca for the illicit market
are almost exclusively areas that have been colonized in the second half of the twentieth
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century, so that the transformation of the land was from virgin rainforest to subsistence
crops and coca. The soils of the South American tropical forests are notoriously fragile.
The settlers utilize slash and burn style agriculture to add nutrients into the soil which is
adequate to sustain their subsistence crops for several years. The coca bush, being
indigenous to the region, is well suited to the soil and does not face the same limitations
of other crops, and is used as a cash crop by the settlers to supplement the food they are
able to grow (Allen, 2005, p 37).
An examination of a plan presented as an alternative to coca illustrates the issues
that arise from the quality of the region’s soil. After having cleared the land and worked
the ashes into the soil, rice is planted the first season, however as a result of the nutrient
needs of rice the soil can only support one year of cultivation. Following the cultivation
of rice, cultivation of pineapples can begin, however the soil will only be able to support
their cultivation for 3 to 4 years. At the same time as cultivation was beginning of the
pineapples, the farmer would need to plant trees such as heart of palm, citrus, or pepper,
so that by the time the pineapple yield is reduced these will be productive, however they
too are expected to have a limited productive capacity of 5 to 6 years. This requires the
peasant to plant rubber trees or poplar trees while planting the palm, citrus, or pepper, so
that harvests of either latex or lumber can begin once the intermediate crops begin to fail
(Thoumi, 2003, pp. 335-336). This proposal for alternative crops has ignored either
banana or coffee crops, two more standard alternatives, because despite being better
suited to the climate and soil, they face significant infective problems in the regions, and
the supply of these goods is already well established in regions far more accessible and
competitive (Thoumi, 2003, p. 336). It seems clear that when faced with the option

18

between simply cultivating coca as a cash crop, or engaging in this rather involved and
unfamiliar sequence of crops, coca will consistently win out in the absence of other
strong incentives.
The illicit nature of the coca crop, and its rise as a result of migration to and
settlement of frontier areas, ensures that it is grown in regions that are rather remote and
where transportation costs are elevated and markets for most goods are extremely limited.
This remoteness represents a serious obstacle to the viability of alternative crops, the
ability to process the goods to a condition capable of long duration transport, and the
delivery of goods to the main markets. A prime example of this issue is demonstrated by
an alternative development project that was attempted in the Chapare. The development
agency established an agreement with the German government to purchase frozen
passion fruit juice at a price of $1,100 per metric ton, however the cost of producing and
transporting the frozen juice was nearly three times this value, leading to the collapse of
the program. The lack of established markets for many of the envisioned alternative
crops, the high cost of delivering many of the goods to the more lucrative markets in the
main cities of the region or the international market, and the failure of planners to take
these issues into consideration has led to the failure of nearly all alternative development
programs (Lupu, 2004, p. 411).
The localized nature of coca cultivation and the fact that much of this cultivation
is the result of migration to the coca growing regions requires some analysis of the
migration incentives. Surveys carried out in the early 1990s in the Chapare region of
Bolivia indicated that only 25% of residents were originally from Chapare, with around
40% coming from other area of Cochabamba Department, 16% coming from the mining
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regions of Potosí and Oruro, and the remaining roughly 20% coming from other portions
of Bolivia. In addition to this data, studies in the area have indicated that many of the
migrants from surrounding highland areas are in fact seasonal migrants, going to Chapare
to grow coca and some subsistence crops, while maintaining their permanent home and
very small plots of land in their traditional highland communities. This study also found
evidence that the families with members engaged in this seasonal migration had incomes
markedly better than those families not engaged in the seasonal migration, expressed
most clearly through quality of housing differences in the highland communities
(Thoumi, 2003, pp. 113-114). In addition to this migration incentive in Bolivia, surveys
from various Peruvian regions are also worth noting. A study was carried out in the early
1990s and looked at a number of rural districts in Peru, some heavily involved in the coca
trade, some with little to no coca. The study found that the average income was
substantially different, with observations that “a predominantly coca area would (have)
double the income of a non-coca area”, which creates a migration incentive related to
coca growing (Thoumi, 2003, p. 245). It is important to note that this study was done
prior to the Peruvian coca price collapse of the late 1990’s, and is indicative of earnings
of the coca trade in the absence of aggressive and consistent interdiction or eradication
operations.
These observations of profitability of coca relative to alternatives, the viability,
both economic and environmental, of alternative crops, and the evaluation of migration
incentives indicate that, in the absence of intense interdiction pressure, coca supplies high
returns and faces minimal opportunity costs. Similar to the case in Afghanistan, the costs
related to social perception of coca cultivation are minimal if any. The long standing
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traditional use of coca by the local populations, the remoteness of the regions and the
isolation of their populations from much of the rest of society, and the view that the
responsibility for the drug trade lies with the Western nations, especially the United
States, who create the demand for the products, are all factors which culminate in little
social aversion to coca cultivation (Steinberg et al, 2004, pp. 154-156).
The political situation in the Andean region is extremely complicated and must be
examined on a nation by nation basis. The situation in Bolivia has historically been
dominated by government targeting of the trafficking and processing segments of the
industry. Up until 1997 this was the case and inflicted little punishment upon coca
growers, indicating that the cost resulting from legal repercussions was minimal. This
incentive structure changed drastically after 1997 when President Banzer announced
“Plan Dignidad”. The policy was successful in eradicating nearly all coca in the Chapare
by 2002, creating significant costs, the near certain destruction of one’s entire crop,
associated with the legal repercussions of coca cultivation (Thoumi, 2003, p. 125). This
policy however resulted in substantial backlash from cocaleros, and helped to see Evo
Morales into the office of the Bolivian President. Morales’ status as a former cocalero
and his pro-coca stance have seen the end of the eradication policy, again allowing the
costs associated with legal repercussion to fall to zero (Branford, 2006).
The structure of political incentives in Peru have been shaped significantly by the
activities of Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist revolutionary group, and Movimiento
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), another leftist guerrilla organization. Both
groups were active in the Huallaga Valley, Peru’s dominant coca growing region, from
the mid 1980s until the early 1990s (Kay, 1999, pp. 102-103). In the early 1980s Peru
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embarked on a forced eradication campaign in the Huallaga Valley. Shortly after the
beginning of this program the revolutionary groups became involved in the area and, as a
result of government operations and the brutality of the Colombian drug organizations,
were quickly able to co-opt many of the coca growers. The Peruvian government
decided that the guerrillas were a larger threat than coca and focused its efforts on
counter-insurgency operations. After the massacre of several unprotected eradication
teams at the hands of the guerrillas, the eradication operation was halted in the region.
This policy move allowed the government to co-opt the coca growers and push back the
guerrilla forces. Following the regaining of government control, anti-coca policies were
again re-instated, leading to the guerrillas again gaining control of the area. Finally after
this episode the Peruvian government abandoned forced eradication and focused its
efforts on counterinsurgency and then on interdiction along the “Peruvian Air Bridge”
(Thoumi, 2003, pp. 130-134). While MRTA has been destroyed and Sendero Luminoso
has been largely defeated, there are still some guerrilla elements that remain, ensuring
that the Peruvian government is hesitant to partake in extensive forced eradication
campaigns, so that in the case of Peru the cost associated with legal repercussions is also
zero.
The Colombian situation is even more complicated by the guerrilla factor.
Colombia is in the midst of an ongoing civil-conflict, the main players being FARC
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), ELN (Ejército de Liberación
Nacional), AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), and the Colombian Government.
The involvement of Colombian guerrilla groups in the drug trade dates back to the 1980s,
with the November, 1985, assault on the Colombian Palace of Justice in Bogotá by the
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M-19 guerrillas. This attack was at the behest of the Medellin cartel, in order to destroy
extradition records and to terrorize the Colombian government into halting the extradition
of cartel members, and compensation to M-19 was estimated at $1 million (Davids, 2002,
pp. 23-24). Most indications are that the guerrillas continued to play a somewhat
ancillary role in the drug trade until the early 1990s, when the collapse of both the
Medellin and Cali cartels left a power vacuum into which they easily stepped (Davids,
2002, p. 24). This increase in guerrilla involvement, coupled with the near complete lack
of state control in much of rural Colombia allows the drug trade to flourish with near
impunity. The only substantial policy utilized by the Colombian state regarding coca has
been attempts at aerial eradication. This operation has largely been targeted at areas
outside of state control, and while substantial amounts of coca have been fumigated the
high level of new planting that is occurring in these areas is largely offsetting what is
destroyed. For example, during 2002 122,695 hectares of coca were reported to have
been destroyed by fumigation, however the total coca crop in Colombia declined by just
over 25,000 hectares, indicating that there were almost 100,000 hectares of new coca
planted in Colombia to offset much of the eradication effort. The feeling of impunity that
encourages this high level of new planting stems largely from two factors, the lack of a
state presence on the ground, and questions of the sustainability of this program, do to
both financial limitations and the high level of violence it has encountered. There were
over 380 incidents of aircraft being damaged and four planes crashing as a result of
ground fire in 2003 alone (Youngers & Rosin, 2005, pp. 112-116). The extensive
destruction of coca fields creates some costs associated with legal repercussions as a
result of crop destruction. The lack of any semblance of state control over areas of coca
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production, and the largely ineffective eradication campaign, as evident by the large scale
new planting, however, indicates that the effective costs imposed by the policy are
minimal.
Looking at all of these factors we see that coca has high returns, faces minimal
opportunity costs, minimal costs associated with social stigma, and faces costs due to
legal repercussions that are largely ineffective or inconsistent. In addition to these
incentives, there is clear evidence that coercion is also used by drug traffickers to
influence the production decisions of farmers. Douglas Davids, in his book “NarcoTerrorism”, relays the story of a Peruvian acquaintance of his who witnessed the
decapitation of two of his brothers when they refused to grow coca, and given the
extreme violence that has been characteristic of the Colombian drug trade over the last 2
to 3 decades, it is reasonable to assume that this was not an isolated incident (Davids,
2002, p. 93). The overall result of this incentive structure and coercive influence is that
the Andean region of South America now produces roughly 300,000 metric tons of coca
leaf which is refined into around 800 metric tons of cocaine HCL annually (Allen, 2005,
p 38, 44).

Impacts of Illicit Drug Cultivation
The examination of the impacts of coca on the nations of Andean South America
requires that the Colombian situation be analyzed separate from the evaluation of Peru
and Bolivia as a result of the substantially different nature of the current Colombian
situation.
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Colombia
There is little doubt that the dominant impact of the drug trade in Colombia has
been political. The increased involvement of fighting groups in the drug trade following
the collapse of the Medellin and Cali cartels has boosted their funding and resulted in
substantial increases in operations during the late 1990s (Thoumi, 2002, p. 111).
Estimates of revenue from involvement in the drug trade for FARC and ELN are a
combined $600-$750 million in 1997 alone, with the AUC also benefiting substantially
(Davids, 2002, p. 25). The open conflict in the Colombian countryside between
government forces, leftist guerrillas, and right-wing paramilitary forces, the latter two
groups now largely funded with proceeds from the drug trade, has resulted in the
displacement of an estimated 1.4 million people, with 308,000 displaced in 1998 alone
(Davids, 2002, p. 27). In addition to the escalation of conflict, drug funds have also led
to the corruption of state officials. The most egregious example of this corruption was
the contribution of over $6 million by the Cali cartel to the election campaign of
President Samper in 1994, indicating that every level of the Colombian government was
for sale (Thoumi, 2003, p. 223).
This expansion of civil conflict and the exposure of high level corruption helped
see Alvaro Uribe into office in 2002. As president of Colombia, Uribe has taken a very
hard-line stance against the guerrillas. Uribe’s administration has overseen an increase in
military excursions into guerrilla controlled areas, an increase in military and police
powers, and the formation of rural peasant militias (BBC, 2005). These policies have
seen a decrease in the rates of kidnappings, displacements and murders (BBC, 2006).
Recent years have also seen a large number of AUC fighters disarmed and disbanded,
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and in 2005 the ELN began peace talks with the government (BBC, 2006). Despite these
successes the conflict in Colombia continues, since FARC, the largest and historically
most active guerrilla organization is still at war with the Colombian government.
The economic impacts of the drug trade are largely a result of the political
situation it has created. The role of the drug trade in the Colombian economy has
decreased since the 1980s, falling from around 7-10% of GNP to 3-4%, alleviating
concerns that the cocaine trade is increasing in economic dominance and undermining the
licit economy as a result (Thoumi, 2002, p. 109). It is instead the increase in conflict
resulting from better funding that has caused serious repercussions for the Colombian
economy. The increased conflict has destroyed and damaged productive assets,
decreased general security and trust, and most importantly has increased the general
condition of instability in the country. This has resulted in increased costs of doing
business, decreased investment, both foreign and domestic, and increased capital flight
(Thoumi, 2003, p. 191). The estimates of the impact of the conflict on the overall
economy of Colombia vary, but all are in excess of $1 billion lost annually. Some
estimate that the increased conflict may be reducing the growth rate of Colombia by 2
percentage points, amounting to an annual cost of roughly $6 billion (Davids, 2002, p.
97; Thoumi, 2002, p. 111).

Peru and Bolivia
As in Colombia, the main impact of the drug trade in Peru and Bolivia has been
political, however to a markedly different degree. While, as previously noted in the
study, Peru has a history with drug funded civil conflict, neither Peru nor Bolivia faces

26

the violence that is present in Colombia. The main political impacts of the drug trade in
these nations are state corruption and limitations of state power. The lucrative nature of
the drug trade, especially the trafficking portion of the trade, allows for the easy
corruption of government officials, and in both countries has led to involvement of
government, and especially the military, in the actual trafficking of narcotics (Thoumi,
2003, pp. 257, 261).
Even more important than the ability of the industry to corrupt the government is
the division that drug cultivation has created between the state and significant portions of
the population. The state position towards the cultivation of coca in both of these nations
inherently puts the state at odds with the thousands of citizens involved in, and dependent
upon, coca cultivation. This division, and its expression through opposition political
parties or the residual threat of insurgency, severely limits the ability of the government
to act effectively and consistently on its stated policy of coca illegality. In Bolivia this is
seen in the formation of sindicatos, or coca growers unions, which are prevalent
throughout the Chapare. The sindicatos have moved to the national stage and were
important in the formation and election victory of MAS, Movimiento a Socialismo, the
political party of Evo Morales, which came to power partly as a result of cocalero
resistance to the eradication campaign of Plan Dignidad, which it has halted (Thoumi,
2003, p. 259; Branford, 2006). The expression of this division in Peru takes on the
characteristics of an undercurrent, while there are no organizations as clearly identified
and organized as the sindicatos and MAS of Bolivia, the memories of the 1980s are fresh
in everyone’s minds. The increase in power of Sendero Luminoso and the alliance of
coca growers with the movement during the 1980s, which was largely the result of
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eradication campaigns, combined with the current persistence of a small group of
fighters, imposes significant limits on the modern policies of the Peruvian government
(Kay, 1999, p. 121).
The economic impacts of the coca trade in Bolivia and Peru are rather limited,
largely because the nations are mostly involved in cultivation and very basic processing,
and not involved in the more lucrative trafficking. The entirety of the drug trade is
estimated to account for roughly 4% of the GNP of Bolivia and less than 2% of the GNP
of Peru, both of which are figures that have decreased significantly since the cocaine
boom of the 1980s (Thoumi, 2003, pp. 154, 157). Important to note is the relative
isolation of this economic activity. While coca cultivation creates considerable
employment in the more remote regions of Peru and Bolivia, and provides incomes above
what would otherwise be possible, the extreme remoteness of the Chapare and Huallaga
Valley, combined with the rather basic and non-input intensive nature of coca cultivation,
has resulted in very minimal linkages to the rest of the economy (Thoumi, 2003, p. 239).
This relative isolation of the coca industry results in a minimal economic impact on the
legal economy outside of the main coca growing regions.
The impacts of coca, like those of opium, seem to most decisively affect the
politics of a nation, and impact the economic conditions of the nation mainly as a result
of the political situation. While the coca trade brings income and employment to the
rural areas, it also brings considerable corruption, division between government and
populace, and above all violence.
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Policy Impacts
There are a number of policy responses to the issue of illicit drug cultivation
which will be examined. However before examining policies that are directed towards
controlling the drug trade we will look at a sample of western policies that are carried out
for domestic or humanitarian reasons, but have unintended effects on the incentive
structure of illicit drug cultivation.

Indirect Policies
The first policy examined is food aid carried out in Afghanistan by the World
Food Program (WFP). The WFP has been involved in distributing wheat throughout
Afghanistan, and while there are many individuals in Afghanistan who need food aid, and
the policy has clear humanitarian intentions, the manner in which it is being carried out is
creating perverse incentives. The WFP has brought in massive amounts of wheat from
outside of Afghanistan, with indications that it has, in fact, brought more wheat than is
truly needed. In addition to the infusion of surplus wheat, the WFP has made no attempt
to purchase any wheat within Afghanistan from farmers with surplus. The combination
of these factors has led to a collapse in wheat prices in significant parts of Afghanistan in
response to the flood of supply (Johnson & Leslie, 2004, p. 126). The status of wheat as
one of the traditional crops grown in Afghanistan, and its position as one of the main
alternative crops to poppies makes this policy disastrous. The actions of the WFP and
similar organizations not only exacerbate the difference in profitability between opium
and wheat, further decreasing the opportunity cost of producing opium, they also punish
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many of those Afghan communities that have refused to grow poppies. Ultimately this
policy simply pushes the incentive structure further in favor of poppy cultivation.
A set of policies which has a significant unintended impact on the incentive
structure of Andean coca cultivation is American agricultural policy. Modern American
agricultural policy is a combination of subsidies and guarantees to farmers which cause
over-production and price depression, as well as protectionist policies that stifle imports.
The Inter-American Development Bank found that American agricultural policy in the
late 1990s depressed the price of corn by 1.4%, the price of soybeans by 3.7%, and the
price of cotton by an amazing 9% (Jank, 2004, p. 114). These crops are of special
interest since corn is a main agricultural product of all three countries of interest, cotton is
important in Peru and Bolivia, and soybeans are an important crop in Bolivia. The
importance of these crops means that boosts in their world price are likely to boost the
overall economy of these nations (CIA, 2006). It is also important to note that these
estimates are based on the policies that were in place in the late 1990s, and that the new
set of policies enacted in the 2002 Farm Bill were anticipated to have an even greater
effect on price (Jank, 2004, p. 114).
In addition to the effects of the subsidy and guarantee programs, the study
indicated that the current protectionist policies also substantially affect these nations.
Liberalization of import restriction was estimated to increase total agricultural exports
from Andean Community countries by 5% and increase exports of processed foods and
other processed agricultural goods by 6.25%. The goods expected to see the greatest
increase in exports were sugar, poultry, and dairy, as well as the products of the beverage
and tobacco industries (Jank, 2004, p. 98). While none of the crops or industries
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mentioned is a direct alternative to coca, therefore not affecting the opportunity cost
associated with the cultivation decision, the current U.S. policy of import restriction and
domestic support does affect the incentives concerning migration. The depressing effects
of these policies on Andean economies reduces the opportunity costs associated with
migrating to coca growing regions, and like the situation in Afghanistan the policy not
only boosts the incentive to be involved in the illicit industry, it also hurts many of those
who chose not to be involved in drug cultivation.

Direct Policies
The three main policies implemented by the governments of producer nations
with the intent of reducing the cultivation of illicit drugs are alternative development,
interdiction, and eradication. The evaluation of each policy will include the manner in
which the policy aims to manipulate the incentive structure of cultivation and a
discussion of the effectiveness of the policy. It is important to note that, given the
situation in Afghanistan and its history over the last twenty years, the examples in this
section are weighted more heavily towards Andean South America.

Alternative Development
The central idea behind alternative development is to make alternative crops, or
alternative sources of income, more lucrative so that farmers can be weaned away from
the illegal crop. This policy hopes to narrow the gap in profitability between the illicit
and licit activities, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of illicit drug cultivation,
hopefully resulting in a decrease in drug production. The overall history of this policy
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approach points to it being a failure as a stand-alone policy, without any example found
that these policies have led to a reduction in drug cultivation without being accompanied
by eradication measures. As was determined in previous sections of this study the gap in
profitability is not the only factor leading to the production of illicit crops, with structural
issues such as infrastructure, and especially in the case of coca, soil quality contributing
to the cultivation decision. The list of alternative development projects that have failed is
extensive, however Lupu examines two of the more recent attempts in Bolivia, looking at
the Agroyungas program and the Chapare Regional Development program (2004). These
projects are simply some of the most recent additions to the failure of alternative
development, and the failure of these projects was largely the result of previously
discussed issues concerning adverse growing conditions for alternative crops and an
inability to get the alternative goods to markets.
Despite these failings as a stand-alone policy there are some indications that the
policy may have merit due to its ability to build relationships between the state and local
communities and its ability to placate individuals affected by other government policies.
The most significant example of this use of the policy was is in the Cauca and northern
Nariño departments of Colombia where there was a reduction of nearly 75% of the coca
crop in communities involved. The program included extensive cooperation with
community leaders in development of alternative crops and the construction of necessary
processing facilities, such as slaughterhouses and sugar and coffee mills, in addition to an
eradication campaign (Thoumi, 2003, p. 346). The most important lesson from this
project is that when utilized in concert with other policies that greatly affect the incentive
structure of the cultivation decision, alternative development policies are able to
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compensate for the potentially negative repercussions of more coercive policies, making
them sustainable.

Interdiction
As a policy approach to illicit crop cultivation the aim of interdiction is to disrupt
the flow of coca or opium from the producing nations or regions to the refining
operations. By intercepting theses shipment the policy intends to deprive cultivators of
the main demand for their crop. This reduction in demand will cause the price to drop,
leading to reduced production. The best example of this policy is the targeting of the
“Peruvian Air Bridge”, discussed in a previous section of this paper, which led to the
collapse of the Peruvian coca price and the reduction of Peruvian coca cultivation by an
estimated 86,000 hectares. While this policy was remarkably successful at the national
level throughout the late 1990s, an examination of the coca trade from the regional level
and examinations of market shocks highlight the weaknesses of this policy.
The main impact of this policy on the regional level was not a reduction in coca
cultivation, but a displacement of coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia. The reduced
supply of coca in Colombia increased domestic coca price and contributed to a boom in
Colombian coca cultivation throughout the 1990s. The Colombian coca crop went from
an estimated 40,000 hectares in 1991 to 80,000 hectares in 1996, and continued to climb
to in excess of 130,000 hectares by 2001, offsetting the reductions in Peruvian cultivation
(Thoumi, 2003, pp. 86-87,152). In addition to the displacement effects of this policy, it is
also susceptible to externally imposed market shocks and smuggler flexibility. These
weaknesses were demonstrated by the increase in Peruvian coca price and harvest in
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2000-2001 resulting from the Bolivian eradication operations, the market shock, and the
increased use of river transport in the Amazon basin, smuggler flexibility (Steinberg et al,
2004, p. 89).

Eradication
The most controversial and coercive policy is the forced eradication of illicit
crops. This policy most often consists of either manual eradication, on the ground
destruction of the crops, or aerial eradication, using chemical herbicides to attack the
crops from plane. This policy utilizes government force to impose a cost on cultivators,
by destroying the crop the government creates a cost equal to the value of the future
earnings and past investment embodied by the coca fields. This policy clearly affects the
incentive structure of the cultivation decision by increasing costs and potentially
destroying all gains, a key factor is how extensively the policy is implemented,
modifying the odds of a specific producer’s field being affected and the perceived costs
of the legal repercussions.
The main example of this policy is “Plan Dignidad”, implemented in Bolivia in
1998. Through a reassertion of state control in the Chapare by constructing military
bases and police posts, the government imposed a policy of forced eradication which was
surprisingly effective and resulted in the eradication of nearly all Bolivian illicit coca
(Steinberg et al, 2004, p. 159). The backlash to this policy was dramatic, which should
not be surprising. The policy significantly damaged the economic position of an
estimated 50,000 families in the Chapare, and despite promises of alternative
development and other aid programs, only 25% of those affected received assistance
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(Farthing and Kohl, 2005, p. 187). As previously mentioned the backlash from the policy
helped bring Evo Morales into government and led to the cessation of the eradication
policy.
The Bolivian experience demonstrates the importance of state control for
eradication operations, especially when compared with the Colombian, Peruvian, and
Afghan experiences. The Bolivian government has control over the Chapare region, and
as a result the eradication effort could be consistent and effective, the lack of government
control over drug growing regions in the other three nations has resulted in eradication
efforts being ineffective and dangerous. The failure and danger of the current Colombian
attempts at aerial eradication and the Peruvian manual eradication in the 1980s have
already been noted. The Afghan example comes from Nangarhar Province in 2002.
While attempting to eradicate opium fields nine government officials were murdered and
farmers then blockaded the region’s main highway in protest of the policy. A visit by the
Afghan Defense Minister to the area in response to the protests was met by a bombing
that resulted in a further 27 dead and 60 wounded (Steinberg et al, 2004, p. 84).
As in the case of interdiction, the policy of eradication can be effective at the
national level, but leads to a displacement of coca cultivation, not a reduction, at the
regional level. The resurgence of Peruvian coca cultivation in 2000-2001 in response to
market signals following the Bolivian eradication operation is evidence of this.

Policy Implications and Suggestions
The examination of the history of illicit drug cultivation and the history of
policies intended to halt this cultivation has one central theme. A lack of state control is
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the core upon which this industry is built. The lack of control in Afghanistan, recently
settled portions of the Andes, and guerrilla controlled portions of Colombia has been
necessary for the development of the trade in illicit crops and the limitation of policies to
suppress this trade. The importance of state control in this trade is especially clear in the
Andes where cultivation has followed the path of least resistance and is now firmly
rooted in rural Colombia, well beyond the reach of government policy. As Peru and
Bolivia increased control over their territories and borders, through crushing guerrilla
movements, increasing military and police presence in frontier regions, and aggressive
pursuit of smugglers, the trade found safe haven in war-torn Colombia.
This flexibility in supply of illicit crops, whether it is the shift in coca cultivation
between Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, or the shift in opium production from Turkey and
Iran to Afghanistan, is coupled with an inelastic demand for the final products of the coca
and opium trade. The demand for opium and heroin in the United States and Western
Europe is price inelastic, meaning the quantity demanded by the consumers of these
goods is relatively unresponsive to price changes. In layman’s terms this means that
users of these drugs generally will have a fairly fixed consumption and their use will not
be deterred by higher prices, they will be willing to pay more to get their fix (Allen, 2005,
p. 108). The combination of this geographic flexibility of supply, the price
responsiveness demonstrated earlier by Peruvian producers, and the willingness of
consumers to pay significantly higher prices when faced with supply shortages poses
serious issues for the goal of reduced consumption through supply-side policies of drug
control.
In light of these issues the following policy approaches seem most appropriate.
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Afghanistan
The central government is far too weak to risk a direct confrontation with the
opium trade, and what little forces it does have are already involved in combating the
remaining Taliban fighters. Additionally, the Afghan economy is far too dependent on
opium production, removal of the trade, even if possible, would have a nearly
unimaginable impact on the livelihood of the Afghan population. The first priority of the
Afghan government is to rebuild the economy so that some semblance of a viable
alternative exists. The government must improve the transportation network, bring the
irrigation system back into operation, and institute a nursery program to help replace the
orchards and other traditional crops that were destroyed. While there is the very real
concern that improvements to the transportation and irrigation systems may result in
increased opium production in the near term, these policies at least create the opportunity
for the resurgence of the legitimate economy.
Further consolidation of state power and increases in the strength of the Afghan
military and police forces are also necessary before directly confronting opium
cultivation. In lieu of eradication campaigns and other policies targeting opium
production, a more feasible policy for the central government to pursue aggressive
interdiction and counter-heroin operations, since these will create far less division
between the government and general population.
Only after the legitimate economy has grown and the balance of power has shifted
in favor of the government, can Afghanistan hope to confront opium cultivation with any
success. The resources of the Afghan government will be best spent rebuilding the
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national economy and building strong military and police forces loyal to the central
Afghan government.

Peru and Bolivia
Neither Bolivia nor Peru face serious threats to state control, and as a result are
able to engage in the whole spectrum of control policies. Both nations should increase
interdiction pressure. Interdiction efforts should target the traditional air bridges utilized
by smugglers, as well as the over-land and riverine networks that have been developed in
response to aggressive aerial interdiction. Additionally both countries should engage in
combination eradication and alternative development operations. The goal of this policy
is to repeat the successes experienced in the Colombian program mentioned before.
This policy would require the maintenance of substantial police forces in the coca
growing regions as well as significant interaction with community leaders, which in the
Chapare is likely to include leaders of the sindicatos. Through this interaction the
organizers could explain the timetable set by the state for coca eradication and could
begin discussions of the alternative development options available to the communities. It
is likely that these development policies would include some form of relocation and land
distribution program since the alternative livelihoods in the coca growing regions are
severely limited by the fragile soils. This combination of policy approaches could
replicate the successes of “Plan Dignidad” without the negative impacts on livelihoods
and political backlash.
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Colombia
The most pressing matter for Colombia is to regain state control over its territory.
While this seems like a rather ridiculous statement to make about a country that has seen
decades of continuous civil conflict, it is essential if there is ever to be any true impact on
the region’s drug trade. The first policy action should be a suspension of the aerial
eradication campaign. This operation has proved largely ineffective at controlling the
coca issue, and even worse it causes further division between farmers in the guerrilla
controlled areas and the state. Colombia needs to follow the Peruvian example and court
the coca farmers as potential allies against the FARC and the ELN. It certainly makes
sense and is advisable that the government aggressively attack operations further along
the cocaine supply chain in hopes of cutting into guerrilla funding, but to continue to
attack coca fields in areas outside of government control will only force Colombian coca
growers further into the guerrilla fold. Only after Colombia has regained territorial
control and has suppressed any remaining insurgent groups can it hope to implement
meaningful and effective counter-coca policies.
The best use of Colombian resources will be in counter-insurgency operations.
Colombia must reassert state control, to allow eradication policies with, at best,
questionable effectiveness to continue to draw resources away from this central goal
makes little sense. Along these lines, it would also be advisable to allow Colombia to
utilize the funds from Plan Colombia for counter-insurgency operations. This move
would likely face some opposition in the United States, but would help establish state
control, allowing the implementation of more effective coca policies at a later date.
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Conclusion
Few if any are foolhardy enough to believe that the drug issue can ever truly be
resolved. A world with out illegal drugs will be a world without crime, one that is simply
beyond belief. The economic incentives for the cultivation of opium and coca are strong.
The profits are substantial, and alternatives are either not economically competitive or not
ecologically viable. The lack of state control in production areas allows growers to
operate with near impunity and is the heart of the current problem. The hope is that
through the implementation of policies like those mentioned above, state control and
accountability can be exerted region-wide, reducing or eliminating the havens that have
enabled drug production. This situation would not only hold the possibility of reducing
the trade and production of illegal drugs, but would also increase stability in the regions
concerned.
This study has provided the opportunity to explore and understand the incentives
and conditions that have led to the modern drug trade, as well as the complexities
involved in combating and restraining it. Hopefully through more studies on this topic
and more extensive exploration of policy impacts, the producer nations, as well as the
consumer nations, involved in the drug trade will implement more effective and
sustainable policies for its control.
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